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Abstract 
The European response to the financial cum sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is leading to a 
democratic crisis of the state. It has exposed a tension between the national and the supranational in a 
multi-level polity whilst opening up new political cleavages between the core and periphery of 
Europe. This dilemma has become particularly acute for programme countries that are either directly 
or indirectly in receipt of non-market financial funding from the troika♣. In the absence of exchange 
rate adjustments, Ireland and southern European countries must pursue an internal devaluation that 
shifts the entire burden of adjustment on to fiscal and labour market policy. National governments, 
regardless of political partisanship, are required to comply with external EMU mandates and liberalise 
their welfare states, cut public spending and impose structural reforms in the labour market. The core 
argument of this paper is that imposing a one-size-fits-all adjustment to diverse economic problems 
across different varieties of capitalism is the real source of the Eurozone crisis. By using a cross-
country comparative analysis of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, I conclude that this is an 
outcome of inbuilt institutional and macroeconomic asymmetries in the EMU. But it is leading to 
unprecedented electoral volatility and a legitimation crisis of the democratic state in Europe. 
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♣ The Troika refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European 
directorate general for economic and financial affairs (ECOFIN). 
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Introduction 
The European response to a financial cum sovereign debt crisis in a currency union without a 
centralised fiscal treasury or political government is an experiment in crisis management. It has 
exposed a tension between the national and the supranational in a multi-level polity. No level of this 
multi-level governance system has the policy instruments to solve the crisis1. Monetary policy remains 
supranational (i.e. European) across seventeen national governments with diverse fiscal, welfare state 
and labour market regimes2. These countries have conflicting interests in terms of who should bear the 
burden of adjustment. For the sake of argument, we can identify this as a tension between creditor and 
debtor countries, or between the core and periphery of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 
Europe3. Much of the economic literature argues that if countries engage in an internal devaluation, 
impose structural reforms in the labour market and implement austere fiscal policies, the crisis will be 
resolved4. This might be true, but it ignores the fact that this is fundamentally a political crisis. Europe 
lacks the strategic capacity to coordinate a response within a currency regime that distributes the 
burden of adjustment evenly across debtor and creditor nations5.  
The EMU member states currently have limited policy discretion to pursue an autonomous 
response to the crisis. In the absence of exchange rate or interest rate adjustment, the entire burden of 
adjustment must fall on domestic prices and wages. In effect, membership of the EMU means that 
national governments only have one policy instrument at their disposal: internal devaluation and 
structural reforms of the labour market6. From a political perspective, national governments must 
comply with the external mandates of EMU membership by reducing their budget deficit to 3 percent 
of GDP. The negative impact this has on employment is legitimated by the economic assumption that 
labour cost competitiveness and export-led recovery is the only way to generate the conditions for 
economic growth. To achieve this, national governments are being encouraged to impose structural 
reforms in product and labour markets as means to enhance cost competitiveness. It is this assumption 
that a convergence in market competition policies will lead to institutional convergence in political 
economic outcomes – across diverse democratic states in the Eurozone – that I challenge in this paper. 
To do this I draw upon and reconceptualise the core tenets of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
theory, in the study of comparative political economy7, and propose a new framework based on 
macroeconomic growth regimes. I argue that the domestic organisation of distinct political economies 
in the north and south of Europe has interacted with transnational European institutions to produce 
divergent economic and employment growth patterns since the establishment of EMU. The source of 
the economic crisis was the attempt to join together institutionally diverse capitalist democracies into a 
single currency whilst failing to account for the asymmetric effects this would produce. Northern 
European countries, I argue, are built around the institutions of a small open export-driven model of 
economic growth. Southern European countries, on the other hand, are institutionally conducive to an 
                                                     
1 See Fabbrini, Sergio (2013) on this collective action problem 
2 See Scharpf, Fritz (2011) for a detailed analysis of this monetary constraint on national adjustment strategies 
3 The European Union has 27 member states. The EMU (currency) consists of 17 member states: Germany, France, Austria, 
Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Portugal.  All EU member states (except the UK and Denmark) are obliged to become members of the Euro currency 
when they satisfy the entry criteria. 
4 See Buti & Carnot (2012) for an analysis that reflects the perspective of the ECB  
5 See Pontusson, J., Raess, D (2012) 
6 See Armingeon & Baccaro (2012a) on the limited variation in policy choices available to Ireland and southern Europe 
7 This is not only related to Hall and Soskice (2002) but a political-economic research tradition that includes, to name but a 
few: Albert, M. (1991), Boyer, R (1990), Esping-Andersen (1990), Crouch, C (1993), Hirst & Thompson (1997) 
Campbell, J.L. (2001), Streeck & Thelen, (2005), and Scharpf (2012). The core insight is that cross-national differences 
in outcomes can be explained by historically embedded institutions and politics. I am specifically interested in combining 
the core insights of the Anglo-American and German tradition in comparative political economy. Both missed the 
importance of the Eurozone as an international political regime. 
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economy based around domestic demand in the non-tradable sectors of the economy. My contribution 
to political science is to illustrate how these growth models are systematically connected in the 
Eurozone, and to analyse the EMU as an emergent multi-level polity in itself.  
In this sense, the article critiques the narrow focus on nation-states in the VoC framework and 
proposes to analyse the core and peripheral countries of EMU as regions within a structurally 
imbalanced currency regime. It is an international case study on what happens when diverse 
democratic states with distinct political economies are integrated into, and subsequently attempt to 
adjust, in a currency union without a centralised federal government.  But this is not to say that VoC 
has nothing to say about the complex problems facing national governments in the EMU. I push the 
VoC argument to its logical conclusion and argue that if nation-states operate according to their own 
distinct political and institutional logic (in my framework; conflicting macroeconomic growth 
regimes) then it is questionable whether some member-states should remain in the Eurozone. The 
European Union (EU) needs a variegated response to the crisis that provides the flexibility for 
member states to carve out an autonomous economic and employment growth strategy at the national 
level. If this is not forthcoming then it is perfectly rational for some member-states to consider leaving 
the EMU, particularly those countries who are not in a position to compete in international markets. 
The core argument of the paper, therefore, is that European policymakers assumed that 
competitive convergence through market integration was possible between diverse capitalist 
democracies. It failed to appreciate the institutional diversity between the north and south of Europe. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis the one-size-fits-all fiscal and structural adjustment programs 
are perpetuating this assumption of convergence. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
first I outline a new VoC theoretical framework that analyses the EMU as a political economy with 
two interactive macroeconomic growth regimes. Second, using this framework, I trace the origins of 
the Eurozone crisis to capital inflows and current account imbalances, which directly emerged after 
the establishment of EMU. Third, I detail the policy response of ‘internal devaluation’ in Ireland and 
southern Europe. Fourth, I analyse the political consequence of this for the Eurozone as a whole. I 
conclude that the one-size-fits-all program of adjustment is leading to an unprecedented legitimacy 
crisis of the democratic state in Europe, with unforeseen political consequences for the EU. 
 
The Diversity of Capitalist Democracies in the Eurozone 
The central research finding in comparative political economy over the past twenty years is that what 
governments do is conditioned by the structure of the political economy. According to Hall and 
Soskice (2002), the organisation of a country’s political economy includes the structure of corporate 
governance, industrial relations, finance, social protection, the labour market, education and training8. 
The relations within these subsectors and their historical evolution over time produce different 
varieties of capitalism. From a political science perspective, they condition the type of public policy 
choices that governments are likely to pursue in times of economic crisis and growth. In the Eurozone, 
one can argue that there are two variants of capitalism. Northern European countries – Germany, The 
Netherlands, Austria and Finland – are often described as coordinated market economies (CMEs)9. 
They have centralised unions and employers with the capacity to autonomously coordinate collective 
bargaining and labour market outcomes. In addition, they have embedded democratic state traditions 
committed to social protection and income security. They have traditionally relied upon export-led 
economic growth as a mechanism to generate employment. Hence, their macroeconomic structure 
supports a preference for stable fiscal policies10.  
                                                     
8 Hancké, Bob et al (2008) highlighted the importance of demand-led southern European economies as a distinct variety of 
capitalism. But there was limited attention paid to the systematic relation between these regimes and northern CMEs 
within the EMU.  
9 See Streeck (2009) and Hassel (2012) for an account of institutional change in Germanys CME model. 
10 See Carlin and Soskice (2011) on the importance of macro-economic choices in an open economy 
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On the other hand, southern European countries in the Eurozone – Spain, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Cyprus – are often described as mixed-market or Mediterranean varieties of capitalism11. 
They have fragmented trade unions and employers with limited capacity to autonomously coordinate 
collective bargaining and labour market outcomes. They have weak welfare states and a significant 
amount of social security occurs through family relations. Traditionally, they have generated economic 
growth through domestic demand. This gives priority to wages, and consumer spending, over profit-
generation in export markets. Prior to EMU, this organisational structure lent itself to an 
accommodating monetary and fiscal policy, with governments regularly devaluing the currency to 
offset a loss of competitiveness and the inflationary impact of a rapid increase in domestic prices. 
Wealth is often held in fixed assets such as property, and corporate governance is dependent on close 
business relations among family-run firms12. Ireland can also be characterised as a mixed-market 
economy, but more liberal in orientation. It differs from the north and south of Europe in that it has a 
business cycle closer to the UK and USA, and a much more flexible labour market. 
The core argument of this paper is that the attempt to join together these two different varieties 
of capitalism into a shared currency within a multi-level polity without a centralised political 
government is the real source of the Eurozone crisis. As stated in the introduction, we can describe the 
organisation of the political economies in southern Europe as conducive to a growth model based on 
wage-led domestic demand. In contrast, the organisation of the political economy in northern Europe 
is conducive to a growth model based on profit-oriented export-driven demand. Both of these regimes, 
however, are systematically connected. That is, the strong export base of northern Europe requires 
high-levels of domestic consumption in the south. The EMU is a semi-closed trading area with less 
than ten percent of trade leaving the Eurozone, but predominately going to other countries in the EU13. 
The EMU was designed as an unaccommodating currency regime that provided unprecedented 
autonomy to the European Central Bank (ECB). This primarily benefited the export-driven model of 
northern Europe. This would not be a problem in a federal state system such as the USA, but it is a 
problem for a polity such as the EMU with no capacity for banking, fiscal, wage, employment or 
labour market coordination – to offset the asymmetric impact of a financial crisis14. 
The core problem with empirical research in the VoC tradition was that it failed to analyse the 
monetary relationship between these macroeconomic growth models within the EMU15. The Eurozone 
is a semi-closed trading area operating in an international money market without a central government. 
VoC research was predominately focused on the institutional complementarities between sub-sectors 
of the economy within the nation-state, and the comparative advantage this provided to multinational 
firms in the export sectors. This provided important insights into why cross-national variations in 
public policy outcomes persist, particularly those pertaining to the labour market. The core conclusion, 
much like Esping-Andersen’s (1990), was that domestic institutions are deeply embedded and difficult 
to change. But it did not allow for a systematic analysis of the financial sector. This is all the more 
unusual when one recognises that, with few exceptions, money driven domestic demand is what drives 
most capitalist development. Hence, I want to highlight one variable that VoC researchers have paid 
insufficient attention to, and which is crucial for understanding the origins and consequences of the 
Eurozone crisis: the monetary relationship between different political regions within the EMU. This 
                                                     
11 See Jackson & Deeg (2006) for a different approach to studying varieties of capitalism 
12 See Molina, O and Rhodes, M (2006) for a more detailed account of mixed-market economies but with no reference to 
EMU 
13 Hancké, Bob (2013) makes this argument in a recent book. It prioritises wage setting institutions and but does not analyse 
the EMU as a political regime in-itself with different macro-economic growth models. 
14 This was a central theme at a conference hosted by the European University Institute (EUI) on ‘The Euro crisis and the 
state of European democracy’. The online book edited by De Witte, Bruno; Heritier, Adrienne; Trechsel, Alexander H, 
can be read here: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/27016 
15 In this sense I want to integrate the literature on capitalist diversity in comparative political economy with the core insights 
of the study of Europeanisation, particularly the critical German tradition which puts emphasis on the multi-level 
structure of decision-making in Europe. 
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requires moving beyond the methodological nationalism of the VoC framework and examining the 
Eurozone as an international regime with competing varieties of capitalism.  
Taking a more international political economy perspective seriously will illustrate the 
importance of analysing the growing political tension between creditor and debtor nations within a 
multi-level polity such as the EMU. Institutional analyses in the VoC tradition paid insufficient 
attention to the declining fiscal capacity of the state to manage crises in a global monetary system16. In 
this sense, VoC has proven to be an insufficient framework for explaining government responses to 
the boom and bust periods of financial expansion in the EMU. Within Europe, there are not only 
distinct macroeconomic growth regimes but also democratic state traditions with distinct tax and 
spend profiles. What makes for a successful fiscal strategy in Italy, France, Greece or Ireland is not the 
same as in Germany and the Netherlands.  But despite very different institutional traditions these 
member-states pooled their national sovereignty into a complex multi-level polity that would restrict 
the fiscal capacity of democratically elected governments to be responsive to the distributional 
demands of the electorate in a crisis (such as using macroeconomic policy to generate demand). As 
will be argued in section (4) all member-states have to adjust by driving down domestic prices and 
wages, despite the negative impact this has for the Eurozone as a whole. 
It is by integrating an empirical analysis on the interactive effect of joining together distinct 
capitalist growth regimes within EMU that I contribute to international political economy. The 
question is not just whether the nation-state or EMU can sustain institutions for economic efficiency 
but whether they can maintain the legitimacy for democratic order in the face of financial markets. I 
will now use this framework to empirically analyse the origins of the sovereign-debt crisis in the 
Eurozone: financial market integration and the creation of cheap money. 
 
The Origins of the Eurozone Crisis: Cheap Money  
The Eurozone is composed of seventeen linguistically diverse countries and has a combined 
population of 317 million people. It has a GDP of €9.4 trillion and accounts for 14.6 percent of global 
trade (the second largest in the world)17. But, importantly, only ten percent of this GDP actually leaves 
the Eurozone, and predominately goes to other EU countries. As argued in the previous section, this 
means that the Eurozone, in effect, is a semi-closed trading economy. A gain in competitiveness for 
one country, by definition, can only come at the expense of another country. The implication is that 
trade has become a zero-sum game among seventeen nation-states sharing the same currency. That is, 
unless a country can gain in market share outside the Euro area it will come at the expense of another 
EMU partner. This has exposed a horizontal political tension between the member states of the EMU. 
Germany accounts for over 26.7 percent of Eurozone GDP, and is by far the largest exporter from the 
trading area. Given its economic resources, it is a rule maker rather than a rule taker when designing 
the policies of EMU. From a macroeconomic perspective, fiscal reflation in a closed economy will 
stimulate aggregate demand. But this Keynesian policy assumes that the closed economy is governed 
by a homogenous nation-state. This is not the case in a polity composed of nation-states with 
competing economic interests, institutions and economic philosophies18. 
The core problem at the heart of the Eurozone crisis is a structural imbalance between export-
led economies with current account surpluses (Germany, The Netherlands, Austria and Finland) and 
countries with current account deficits (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland) that emerged 
directly after the establishment of the EMU in 2000 (see Figure 119). These divergent trends are 
usually taken to illustrate the underperformance and loss of competitiveness by the ‘GIIPS’ (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries in the Eurozone, and were central to the establishment of 
                                                     
16 This argument is influenced Pierson, Paul (1994, 1996 and 2001). See also Streeck and Mertens (2013).  
17 See De Grauwe, P., & Ji, Y. (2013). Panic-driven austerity in the Eurozone and its implications. VoxEU. org, 21. 
18 See Peter Hall (2012a, 2012b)  
19 I use the most similar/ most different research design to select these four regions of EMU. I take Ireland and Spain as 
representative cases of the periphery. They both had asset price booms and now carry large levels of private debt. 
Germany and the Netherlands are representative the CME creditor core. Combined they illustrate the broader trend and 
macroeconomic imbalances between north and south of Europe since the creation of the single currency. 
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the new EU Commission ‘macroeconomic scorecard’ in 201120. The indicators in this scorecard are 
firmly focused on how to improve the balance of payments for debtor countries, through holding down 
unit labour costs. This, by definition, promotes competition in wages among member states as a 
strategy for economic development. Coordinated wage restraint by centralised unions and employers, 
made possible by domestic institutions, is certainly one of the core factors in explaining the export-
oriented strategy of small open economies in Europe21. Germany, despite its size, is perhaps the best 
example of this. But from the perspective of EMU as a whole, what this approach to wage competition 
fails to appreciate is the negative impact it has on the exporting capacity of other countries sharing the 
same currency. This is all the more problematic if we accept that within the Eurozone there are two 
different macroeconomic growth models in the north and south: export-profit and domestic-wage 
demand. In this context, holding down wages in a semi-closed trading area negatively affects all 
member-states but particularly those countries dependent on domestic demand. 
What the divergence in current account balances in figure 1 actually illustrates is that from 
2000 to 2008 Ireland and Spain imported more than they exported22. Capital flew out of countries 
where exports exceeded imports, such as Germany, to purchase assets located in countries with 
increased domestic demand (Ireland and Spain), fuelling domestic prices and house price booms23. 
Since 2000, Germany’s current account surplus (€192.2bn) has been identical to the combined current 
account deficit of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain24. This export of capital meant that these deficit 
countries became indebted to surplus countries, with the implication that their economies become 
heavily reliant on private credit to fuel domestic demand (see Figure 2). All of this was made possible 
by a one-size-fits-all monetary policy by the ECB and a single interest rate that made cheap credit 
widely available for peripheral member states after entry to the EMU. Hence the current account 
imbalances occurred because private banks in some member states took advantage of negative interest 
rates, and the absence of exchange rate restrictions, and began borrowing excessively on the European 
money markets for domestic consumption. VoC theorists failed to analyse this financial relation 
because it was focused on the domestic export strategies of manufacturing firms. 
But the increase in capital inflows from the core to the periphery is precisely what the political 
leaders who signed up to EMU wanted and got from the single currency25. For Germany, it provided 
an anchor for a stable exchange rate that would benefit its export-driven model within Europe. It 
removed the volatility of exchange rate fluctuations and the ability of its trading partners to devalue 
their currencies relative to the Deutschmark. It provided an integrated European finance market that 
was highly profitable for German banks. France, on the other hand, feared the economic might of 
German reunification, and sought a tool that would generate the conditions for a federal Europe that 
would decrease rather than increase the power of German money26. For Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal, the EMU would reduce the cost of borrowing and facilitate capital inflows for national 
investment. All these countries got what they wanted. This is less a case of economic calculation but 
distributional politics. The critical mistake was that policymakers assumed that a convergence in ECB 
market interest rates, in addition to strict fiscal policies to be embedded in the Growth and Stability 
Pact, would provide the conditions for an institutional convergence in business cycles across diverse 
capitalist democracies in the Eurozone. This has proven to be a fundamental mistake. 
                                                     
20 See European Council (2011): The Euro Plus Pact: stronger economic policy coordination for competitiveness and 
convergence, 
     Conclusions of the European Council of 24/25 March 2011, Annex 1, EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1, Brussels. 
21 See Carlin, Wendy and Soskice, David (2009) 
22 See De Grauwe, Paul et al (2012) 
23 See Fitzgerald et al (2012) 
24 The economic problems in Italy are somewhat different to other deficit countries. Italy has always had high-levels of 
national debt. Its economic crisis is directly related to declining productivity and beyond the scope of this paper. 
25 See Moravcsik, Andrew (2012) 
26 This historical dimension to the politics of elites in European integration has been central to European political science but 
not comparative political economy.  
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The assumption of institutional convergence was not present in the negotiations that led to the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in the late 1970s. During this period there were competing 
perspectives between the ‘monetarists’ and the ‘economists’27. The German Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, refused to accept a shared currency until there was real convergence in fiscal policy regimes. 
The monetarists, on the other hand, argued that a currency union would itself lead to economic 
convergence and eventually a political union in Europe. After Maastricht, there was a blurring of the 
two positions. It was assumed that a single interest rate would lead to market convergence but only if 
the ECB was constructed in the image of the Bundesbank, and complemented with strict fiscal rules to 
be imposed on member countries. A deeper analysis, reflecting much economic literature on rational 
expectations, argued that ‘structural reforms’ in product and labour markets is what will really drive 
institutional convergence28. Countries that implemented supply-side structural reforms would generate 
the conditions for price and wage flexibility, and therefore develop the capacity to adjust their 
economies in the aftermath of an asymmetric shock. This is the core economic idea that underpins the 
European response to the crisis today. 
The problem with this perspective, however, is that it completely ignores the fact that this is a 
crisis of the monetary system in Europe. It assumes that committed governments with the ‘correct’ 
techno-economic policies can easily overcome structural debt problems. The prescribed structural 
adjustment programmes in Ireland and southern Europe are premised on the assumption that if 
governments liberalise their welfare state, decentralise collective bargaining and flexibilise the labour 
market they will eventually generate the conditions to compete with the German model of capitalism 
in international export markets. It is certainly true that Germany introduced deeply contested structural 
reforms in the post-EMU era (usually captured under the ‘Hartz reforms’), which created significant 
political and distributional turmoil for both SPD and CDU-led coalitions. In this regard, Germany has 
the legitimacy to prescribe structural reforms as a panacea to the economic and employment crises in 
southern Europe. But it would be a mistake to assume that these reforms underpin the competitive 
resilience of the German economy. This can be traced to the embedded corporatist institutions that 
provide economic actors with the resources to negotiate political compromises and solve complex 
economic problems29. Germany had the strategic capacity to carve out an autonomous response and 
develop an export-led strategy that complemented the monetary constraints of EMU.  Ireland and 
Southern Europe do not have this industrial base.  
Hence, whilst divergent current account imbalances within EMU certainly indicate the 
different long-term growth potential of southern and northern European economies, and therefore their 
capacity to pay off debt and achieve lower interest rates on government bonds, they primarily reflect 
two different macroeconomic growth models (consumption versus exports) that became systematically 
connected through the European financial market. Deficit countries (in the private and public sector) 
borrowed cheap money from surplus countries to feed domestic demand. This may or may not have 
crowded out their export sectors. But given that the Eurozone is a semi-closed trading economy, it 
would have been systematically impossible for all countries to pursue a German export strategy. Each 
participant benefitted from the financial exchange. Furthermore, this is precisely what the 
policymakers of EMU had intended. However, they did not achieve their expected institutional 
convergence in the export organisation of national political economies across member-states.  
 
The Real Impact of EMU: Macroeconomic Divergence 
The outcome of joining these different varieties of capitalism together was that post-EMU wage-
driven economies experienced a financial orgy, fuelling divergent and uncoordinated business cycles 
(see figure 3). Investors threw their money at risky investments, leading to asset price bubbles and 
subsequently private sector debt. The Euro currency as an isolated variable did not cause this but it 
made some member states extremely vulnerable to financial markets and a sudden stop in capital 
                                                     
27 See Mourlon-Druol (2012) for a history of elites decision making in the formation of EMS 
28 See Peter Hall (1992) on the importance of economic ideas during this transition period.  
29 See Streeck, W (1991) and Culpepper, Pepper (2012) 
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inflows. This is precisely what happened to Ireland and southern Europe from 2008 to 201230. In fact, 
the extent of capital inflow is the single most important variable for analysing which member-states 
got into trouble in the aftermath of the financial crisis31. In the Eurozone, countries experiencing a 
boom in domestic demand borrowed excessively either for private spending (Ireland and Spain) or 
public spending (Greece). The outcome of these credit bubbles was strong economic and employment 
growth in the domestic economy. This provided national governments with unprecedented fiscal 
resources to satisfy the legitimate political-distributional demands of their electorates. 
Hence the real impact of EMU was not macroeconomic convergence but an explosion in 
cross-border capital flows, cheap credit and an inevitable rise in monetary debt cross Ireland and 
southern Europe (see figure 4 and 5). None of the peripheral countries had the policy tools to control 
the awesome power of cheap money. But from a VoC perspective it was perfectly rational for these 
countries to take advantage of the absence of exchange rate restrictions. Their domestic economic and 
political institutions are more conducive to facilitating domestic-consumption than export-led growth. 
The problem was not economic growth based on domestic demand in itself, but the composition of the 
investments that were made. In Ireland and Spain the banking sector invested cheap money into the 
commercial and housing mortgage markets, leading to an asset-price boom32. This, in turn, created the 
perverse effect of higher inflation rates in countries such as Ireland when compared to the pre-EMU 
period. During this period, the ECB was targeting the average Harmonised Consumer Price Index 
(HCPI) across member states experiencing diverse business cycles. The problem with this measure is 
that it did not consider asset-price inflation33. Hence, the ECB completely missed the impact of house 
price inflation on national competitiveness – measured in unit labour costs – across the EMU 
periphery. They were primarily focused on traditional product markets, not the financial sector. 
The divergence in competitiveness shown in figure 6 reflects an increase in the overall share 
of the non-tradable sectors (construction, domestic retail and public administration) in the economy.  
Divergent wage-setting institutions, associated with different varieties of capitalism, certainly 
contributed to this but it was generally caused by the inflow of capital imports from surplus countries 
(Germany). When these capital flows went into reverse during the international financial crisis the 
deficit countries got into economic difficulty. Hence, it is not competitiveness per se that is the 
underlying problem of current account imbalances in the north and south of Europe but the 
accumulation of debt. On the one hand this can be explained by the fiscal recklessness of political 
parties in government (Greece), but it was primarily the result of reckless behaviour by private market 
actors in private finance markets. This was made possible by an integrated and liberalised European 
money market that began with the abolition of capital controls in the 1980s, followed by the 
harmonisation of financial regulations in the 1990s, and culminated in the single currency: EMU34. No 
amount of supply-side oriented structural reforms will resolve this financial problem. 
The political fallout within the EMU when these credit bubbles burst is now part of European 
history. In Ireland and southern Europe, the level of private and public debt accumulated was quickly 
made visible to citizens and markets. Increased tax revenues made possible by a period of full 
employment and high growth collapsed when domestic demand contracted. Governments stepped in to 
guarantee the bad debts of their banks. Fiscal deficits increased and debt-GDP ratios soared. In the 
absence of a lender of last resort (i.e. the equivalent of the Federal reserve), international investors 
panicked. Government bond yields rapidly diverged and the fragility of the Eurozone was exposed35. 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal were catapulted out of international finance markets and had to resort to 
ECB-IMF-EU (troika) loans to avoid a sovereign default. In return for this ‘bailout’ these member-
                                                     
30 See Lane, Philip (2012) 
31 This variable has been consistently pointed out by Martin Wolff, chief economics commentator for the Financial Times 
32 This is not to deny the variation among these countries. For a more detailed analysis see Monastiriotis, Vassilis, Niamh 
Hardiman, Aidan Regan, Chiara Goretti, Lucio Landi, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, Carmen Marín, and Ricardo Cabral (2013) 
33 See Hay, C. (2009).  
34 See Sadeh, T., & Verdun, A. (2009).  
35 See De Grauwe, P. (2012).  
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states were required to implement an aggressive internal devaluation: public sector adjustment and 
structural reforms, on the assumption that wage competitiveness was the fundamental problem.  
The sovereign-debt crisis soon spread to Spain and Italy. Whilst these countries have not been 
directly priced out of the international bond markets, they required emergency funding from the ECB 
to keep their banking systems and economies liquid. In return for this they too must impose structural 
reforms and cuts in public expenditure. Hence, rather than confront the asymmetric implications of 
joining together different varieties of capitalism into a shared currency, and propose a shared solution 
to an interconnected private banking crisis, European policymakers shifted the burden of adjustment 
on to the debtor countries in Ireland and southern Europe. The policy response of ‘internal 
devaluation’ is designed to save the common currency and the best way to do this, it is argued, is for 
member-states to follow the structural reforms of Germany. But what are the political implications of 
this economic strategy for collective decision-making in the European Union? 
 
Responding to the Eurozone Crisis: Internal Devaluation.  
There are four important political science observations to be made about the European response to the 
financial cum sovereign debt crisis, and the proposed solution of internal devaluation. First, it was not 
supranational institutions such as the European parliament or commission that managed to impose a 
one-sided adjustment across the Eurozone, but the European Council. The new executive powers that 
have emerged from the EU Council in the aftermath of the crisis have created a mode of governance 
that mirrors an executive federalism with no formal legislative legitimacy36. The outcome is an inter-
governmental regime that gives ultimate priority to fiscal stability as the primary solution to the 
financial imbalances at the heart of the Eurozone. In particular and reflecting the intergovernmental 
mode of decision-making that has emerged, Germany has succeeded in getting all member states to 
pursue individual national austerity policies aimed at an internal devaluation, and to institutionalise 
this into a new Eurozone ‘fiscal compact’. This has given the EU Council unprecedented procedures 
and capabilities to both monitor and sanction member states for violating the rules of austerity37. It 
gives priority to inter-state bargaining and competitiveness within the EMU.  
Second, in the Eurozone, unemployment has crept above 12 per cent. But this masks the 
deeper asymmetric implications of the unemployment crisis in Ireland and southern Europe (Figure 7). 
The unemployment rate is 27 per cent in Greece, 26 per cent in Spain, 17 per cent in Portugal and 
almost 15 per cent in Ireland. More worrying, however, is the distribution of this crisis within 
countries. The cross-national youth unemployment rate in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece varies 
between 42 and 56 per cent38. Most of this is the outcome of a contraction in domestic consumption, 
not industrial output. To overcome the unemployment crisis these wage-driven economies are being 
encouraged to adopt labour market supply-side reforms, as a complement to fiscal retrenchment, in 
order to generate long-term growth. But there is only negligible research on the effectiveness of these 
reforms in international political economy39. Empirically, it is widely accepted that structural reforms 
only work as a long-term strategy in a period of strong economic growth, and when complemented by 
social security policies that ensure high levels of income replacement40. From 2002, this was accepted 
and embedded in the policy discourse of the EU Commission on Labour and Social Affairs, which 
attempted to promote the ‘flexicurity’ regimes of Nordic economies. Since the crisis, however, the 
policy response to labour market problems has been dominated by ECOFIN. The outcome is that 
national governments are adopting policy responses that contradict not complement their domestic 
institutional political economies. This, however, can only be understood if we prioritise the demand 
side of macroeconomics, rather than the supply-side, as assumed in traditional VoC theory. 
                                                     
36 This argument has also been advanced by Jürgen Habermas (2012).  
37 See Croon, J. & Maduro, M. P. (2012). 
38 See Gros, Daniel. "Europe’s Recurrent Employment Problems." CEPS Policy Brief 271 (2012). 
39 See Armingeon & Baccaro (2012b), and Avdagic, Sabina & Salardi (2013) for recent analyses  
40 See Hemerijck (2012), Bonoli, G (2005) and Morel, N., Palier, B. and Palme, J (2011) 
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Third, the priority accorded to fiscal stability and structural reforms that has emerged from the 
EU Council completely ignores the central problem facing member-states in Europe: how to regain 
control over financial markets. The frustrated attempts to regulate the international financial system 
and its parametric expression in the EMU are being blockaded by political fragmentation among 
nation-states. This is particularly the case for Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) such as 
Germany, who jealously guard their prerogatives to defend their domestic export sectors, and are 
therefore reluctant to build new supranational capacities for political action. The fiscal pact ultimately 
sets the seal on the intergovernmental mode of national regulation which makes it possible for national 
governments to narrowly promote the specific interests of their national variety of capitalism – 
blocking off a supranational response41. 
Finally, and most importantly for the theoretical argument being developed in this paper, the 
ECB-inspired fiscal stability agenda promotes a one-size-fits-all solution that does not take into 
account the need for differential adjustment programmes in the north and south of Europe. It rules out 
flexible interventions that are tailored to the specific economic growth models, political institutions 
and economic cultures in each member state42. The underlying cognitive argument used to validate 
this strategy is the notion of Ricardian equivalence or ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’43. It is assumed 
that a shrinking public sector will lead to increased competitiveness in the private sector, which in turn 
will kick start an economic recovery based on export-led growth. The subsequent improvement in the 
current account, it is argued, will send a signal to international financial markets that the government 
has the capacity to pay back its long-term borrowings. The problem with all of this, of course, is that it 
is based on minimal empirical data44. It is based on the same logical argument that was used to create 
the EMU in the first place, namely that a one-size-fits-all adjustment can solve diverse political 
problems, and lead to market convergence. 
From a VoC perspective, the divergence in outcomes and the failure to resolve the crisis by 
shifting the burden of adjustment on to deficit countries is unsurprising. There is not a complementary 
institutional fit between the national fiscal and labour market policies of each member state and EMU. 
Monetary policy remains Europeanised yet the institutions to transmit this to the real economy remain 
national, with the result that the various ECB monetary easing programs since 2011 are not having the 
assumed expansionary effect on the real economy. Banking, much like fiscal, wage, social and labour 
market policies operate at the national, not European, level45. Hence, the assumption that an 
institutional complementarity between all these sub-spheres of the economy can be achieved through 
the implementation of stricter rules is not possible if one accepts that there are different varieties of 
capitalism in Europe. But it does draw our attention to the complexity of decision-making among 
heterogeneous democratic states in a multi-level polity during hard economic times, and it is on this 
point that a theory focused on the nation-state, such as VoC, has limited explanatory power.  
 
The Political Consequences for Eurozone Governance 
Political leaders at the national level in creditor and debtor countries are operating in a complex 
institutional matrix that offers competing incentives and constraints on their behaviour. They have to 
respond to the popular preferences of domestic electorates to ensure re-election and simultaneously 
respond to the interests of other political leaders at the EU level, to ensure their membership of a 
‘government of governments’46. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis this has become an 
asymmetric tension. Those countries with the most economic resources are in a significantly stronger 
                                                     
41 See Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2012). 
42 To a certain extent this reflects the limited influence of research in comparative political economy on policy-making 
among political elites. Orthodox economics dominates the policy response. See Blyth (2013) 
43 This is based on a discussion with an ECB official monitoring the Irish adjustment.  
44 See Blanchard, O., Jaumotte, F., & Loungani, P. (2013a and 2013b) 
45 See Mody, A.& Sandri, D. (2012). The eurozone crisis: how banks and sovereigns came to be joined at the hip. Economic 
Policy, 27(70), 199-230.  
46 See Scharpf, Fritz (2012) 
Aidan Regan 
10 
bargaining position to get other member states to comply with their interests. But simultaneously 
countries such as Germany must comply with European Union law47. 
Presently, the EU lacks all the pre-requisites of input legitimacy that characterise a nation-
state. There are no European-wide political parties48; there is no European-wide capacity to generate 
revenue and no directly elected President or European government capable of acting in the common 
interest. Political cleavages and the public sphere remain an entirely national affair. Furthermore, the 
capacity to coordinate a European-wide solution to the Eurozone debt crisis is restricted by the 
multiple veto points built into sharing sovereignty in a multi-level polity. Policymaking and power 
relations are diffused across a wide variety of actors and institutions. It is for all these reasons that 
Fritz Scharpf has long argued that the EU is best characterised as a negative process of market-making 
that is structurally biased toward the promotion of neoliberal markets49. Even if social democrats 
wanted to turn the EU into a federal system capable of satisfying the most basic social contract 
implicit in national welfare states they would be incapable of doing so because of institutional 
asymmetries50. The outcome for Scharpf (2012) is a variant of Hayekian technocracy. 
Supranational European institutions such as the European parliament, and to a certain extent 
the European Commission, have been side-lined during the crisis. They have been replaced by 
intergovernmental Eurozone summits between heads of state as the main forum for political decision-
making. The Commission subsequently monitors and implements the outcomes, particularly the 
financial and economic affairs commissioner. In a context of crisis management, where creditor 
countries in northern Europe are being requested to distribute scarce resources to deficit countries in 
the south, this shift to national bargaining should not be surprising. But it draws our attention to the 
asymmetrical influence of powerful nation-states, as opposed to European political actors, in 
designing the structural adjustment programs in Ireland and southern Europe. Hence, contrary to the 
assumptions of pro-Europeans from Jürgen Habermas to Ulrich Beck, the crisis is not leading to more 
European integration but a return to the nation-state, with national governments defending the interests 
and comparative advantage of their national economies. The outcome is a German EMU. 
 
The Political Consequences for the Democratic Nation-State 
In Ireland and southern Europe there has been unprecedented electoral volatility at the national level 
under the Troika adjustment programmes. The general trend is that incumbent governments, regardless 
of partisanship, who implement economic policies that are imposed upon them by external actors, are 
being severely punished at the ballot box. In Ireland in 2011, the main party of the centre-right 
coalition, Fianna Fail, went from 77 seats in parliament to 20. This is unprecedented in Irish politics51. 
Its coalition partner, the Green party, lost all its seats at both the national and the local level. The 
current centre-right coalition, Fine Gael and Labour, won the election on the basis that they would 
renegotiate the Troika adjustment programme. This never materialised. The Labour party is suffering 
the most in electoral terms. It received 33 seats in parliament in 2011, its biggest electoral victory in 
history. In the current polls it is set to lose 18 of these seats. In a recent by-election it received less 
than 5 percent of the vote. 
The Greek centre-left party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), won 43 percent of 
the national vote in 2009. In 2010 it entered the Troika adjustment programme and began to 
implement the conditional austerity measures. In 2011 the Prime Minister, George Papandreou, 
resigned after a series of violent protests and the government collapsed. In the subsequent 2012 
election PASOK suffered a historic defeat and barely secured 13 percent of the vote52. The newly-
                                                     
47 During the crisis there has been growing tension between the ECB and the German polity. Many economic elites in 
Germany consider the EU as facilitating moral hazard among feckless peripheral state. 
48 With the ironic exception of the Irish-based ‘Libertás’ which is a right-wing conservative libertarian party   
49 See  Höpner & Schäfer (2010, 2012) 
50 See Sabel, C and  Zeitlin, J (2010) on ‘new forms of experimental governance’ for an alternative perspective 
51 See Marsh, Michael (2012) 
52 See Dinas and Rori (2013) 
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emerged leftist party, Coalition of the Radical Left – Unitary Social Front (SYRIZA), under its new 
charismatic leader, Alexis Tsipras, took 27 percent of the popular vote. A government was formed by 
the centre-right New Democracy, which whilst losing 10 percent of the vote secured enough seats to 
form a minority government. A neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, won 18 seats in parliament. According 
to current polls (2013) it would win over 11 percent of the vote if new elections were held, giving it 
the balance of power in parliament53. The post-dictatorship political party system comprised by the 
centre-left and centre-right is collapsing.  
In 2005, the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) won 45 percent of the vote, which was reduced to 
35 percent in 2009. In 2012 after entering the Troika adjustment it suffered its largest ever defeat, 
taking 28 percent of the vote54. In six years it lost over 30 seats. The current centre-right liberal party, 
the Social Democrats, increased its popular vote from 28 percent to 38 percent. But according to 
current polls it would be voted out of office if a new election were held, with a variety of emergent 
parties set to change the parliamentary landscape. The trend is identical to other EMU programme 
countries: sitting governments, regardless of political partisanship, are being voted out of office with 
new parties and social movements emerging that are likely to reconfigure the political landscape. 
In Spain and Italy similar processes can be observed. A snap general election in 2011 was 
called in Spain after the perceived failure of the government to cope with the economic crisis. The 
ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), led by former Deputy Prime Minister Alfredo Pérez 
Rubalcaba, suffered its worst election since Spain’s transition to Democracy in 197755. It went from 
43.9 to 28 percent of the national vote. The centre-right Peoples Party under Mariano Rajoy swept to 
power taking 44 percent of the popular vote. But Rajoy is now confronted with increased national 
separatist movements across Spain. This return to regional politics, particularly in Catalonia, is 
primarily driven by nationalist discourses that are in contradiction with pro-European integration56. 
It is in Italy, however, that there has been most political volatility. In 2013 the electorate 
rejected the technocrat Mario Monti and his Civic Movement. It received 10 percent of the vote, which 
is less than what had been obtained by the pre-existing centrist parties that he gathered to form his 
civic movement. While the Social Democratic Party, ‘Partitio Democratico’ (PD) led by Pier Luigi 
Bersani, emerged as the largest party, taking 29.5 per cent of the vote, this was 8 percent less than 
what they had achieved in the 2005 elections. The clear winner of the Italian elections was Beppe 
Grillo and the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement). This emerged out of nowhere to take 
25 per cent of the vote, recording the largest ever vote share for a party entering its first election57. 
Berlusconi’s centre-right ‘Popollo Della Libertá’ (PDL) emerged as the second largest party, taking 29 
per cent of the vote. Some have lauded this as a political comeback, but it hides the fact that it was the 
biggest ever defeat for a sitting party in Italian elections, losing 16 per cent of its vote. This is much 
like what happened to the Christian Democrats in the late 1980s. The outcome of the election was that 
Italy found itself in the hands of the Eurosceptic Beppe Grillo, who does not play by the rules of 
representative democracy, heralding an unprecedented crisis for the Italian polity.  
National governments across the Eurozone have opted for the responsible position of 
internalising the adjustment pressures associated with EMU membership and have prioritised the 
interest of corporate creditors over their citizens58. The problem with this, however, is that responsible 
governments are now implementing irresponsible economics. National governments have not been 
able to adopt a variegated response that is tailored to the specific needs of their domestic economies. 
This could be justified if fiscal consolidation and structural reforms solved the diverse economic 
problems facing these countries. The IMF (2013a and 2013b), among a whole host of other 
commentators, has since concluded that this is not the case. Their one-size-fits-all adjustment is 
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54 See Afonso et al (2013) 
55 See Kennedy (2012) 
56 See Wiley & Martinez (2010) 
57 See Regan, Aidan (2012) 
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exacerbating the debt, employment and economic crisis. The outcome is growing popular support for 
anti-austerity political movements on both the far left and the far right. In this situation, both the input 
and output legitimacy of the democratic state in Europe is being called into question59.  
 
Rethinking Varieties of Capitalism  
The response to the Eurozone crisis draws our attention to the declining fiscal capacity of the 
democratic state to shape distributional outcomes in capitalist democracies60. The institutional design 
of the EMU and the emergent economic governance regime underpinning it has added an additional 
constraint to this long-standing problem in Europe. It leads to four empirical observations that are 
particularly important for understanding the relationship between the debt crises and how to govern 
different varieties of capitalism in a complex multi-level polity such as the EMU.  
First, there is a growing gap in EMU countries between public revenue and public 
expenditure, with the implication that governments have to increasingly borrow money on 
international markets to service the state. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis governments stepped 
in to guarantee the debt of private markets. The outcome was a sovereign debt crisis. Rather than the 
state ‘taxing’ market activities to pay for the crisis, they now ‘borrow’ it from the same markets61. 
Most economic analyses have focused on the impact of this increase in public debt on the long-term 
growth potential of the economy62. What has not been analysed in sufficient detail is the impact of 
public debt on the ability of political parties in government to use discretionary fiscal spending to pay 
for the social investments we traditionally associate with the welfare state. The crisis of the democratic 
welfare state is precisely at this nexus between the irreconcilable tension between decreasing revenue 
and rising social expenditure. 
Second, with less revenue and increased dependence on financial markets for expenditure, 
national governments have prioritised the interest of corporate creditors in negotiating fiscal 
adjustment. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the public finances in Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy were thrown off course by a sudden increase in the interest rate charged by finance 
markets for sovereign bonds63. A marginal increase in the rate of international borrowing alters the 
composition of domestic budgets. It means that a significant amount of expenditure must go on 
refinancing interest payments alone. The outcome is that national governments, regardless of political 
partisanship, are increasingly unable to use the taxpayer’s money to invest in social projects that 
benefit citizens. They must satisfy the interests of a growing new constituency: private creditors and 
investors64. But if one accepts that different varieties of capitalism exist in Europe, the outcome is 
even bleaker for countries running a current account deficit. Cuts in social spending and an increase in 
the cost of borrowing decrease the capacity of southern European governments to build the 
institutional infrastructure and the research, training, social and educational opportunities that are 
necessary to compete with the social and coordinated market economies of northern Europe. 
Third, contrary to the technocratic assumptions underpinning the EMU, it is not democratic 
pressure from citizens that is restricting the composition of budgetary adjustments but tax competition. 
The problem is a declining capacity of the fiscal state to raise revenue. For example, in the aftermath 
of the crisis successive Irish governments have adopted a strategy in Brussels of accepting and 
promoting fiscal discipline as a solution to macroeconomic imbalances. The international diplomatic 
strategy of aligning Ireland with austere northern Europeans is designed to protect its low corporate 
                                                     
59 This is not to say that large scale protests and dissatisfaction with the state and political parties are a problem for 
democracy. On the contrary, they may be a better indicator than elections. 
60 See Schafer, Armin and Streeck, Wolfgang (2013). It reflects the core argument advanced by Paul Pierson on the politics 
of permanent austerity. 
61 There is an emergent research agenda on this at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne, Germany. See Streeck & Mertens 
(2013) 
62 Such as Reinhardt and Rogoff (2010) 
63 The irony is that these markets were saved only months previously by state guarantees to bondholders in domestic banks. 
64 See Schafer, Armin and Streeck, Wolfgang (2013) 
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tax regime. Ireland has opposed all attempts at a coordinated transaction tax on financial trading in the 
EMU, which reduces the capacity of the EMU to collectively raise revenue within its jurisdiction to 
solve the crisis. The Irish policy to resist a European financial transaction tax was designed by the 
Clearing House Trading Company, a financial lobby group with a permanent committee in the Prime 
Minister’s Office65. The Portuguese government has done likewise. In the midst of unprecedented cuts 
to social spending and increases in income tax, governments are simultaneously cutting corporate tax 
rates to incentivise inward investment. The interests of this growing new constituency for market-
conforming governments – international creditors and the holders of financial assets – have 
significantly more influence on public policy than citizens66. 
Fourth, the priority accorded to repaying interest on debt places long-term restrictions on the 
ability of competing political parties to offer alternative choices to the electorate. This is directly 
observable in the GIIPS countries in the aftermath of the crisis. Political parties change yet policy 
remains the same. In a context in which citizens cannot influence government decisions, all claims to 
input legitimacy have been suspended67. The most minimal requirement of representative liberal 
democracy is that citizens can make a meaningful input to shaping collective policy choices (usually 
through elections or democratic corporatism). If this is empirically non-observable then it is fair to say 
that the democratic state is in crisis. This dilemma could be overcome, however, with claims to output 
legitimacy. That is, citizens in a democratic republic might accept the absence of input legitimacy in 
the interest of ‘investor confidence’ if the Euro-technocratic economic policies being implemented 
(cuts in public expenditure, decentralised collective bargaining, and structural reforms of the labour 
market) led to effective outcomes, such as economic and employment growth68. But this is not the 
case. For all the GIIPS countries in the Troika adjustment programme (directly or indirectly) the debt-
GDP ratio has increased, economic growth has contracted and unemployment is rising, whilst 
budgetary deficits have been only marginally reduced. 
Finally, if joining together different varieties of capitalism is a central factor in explaining the 
crisis, and the one-size-fits-all response of EMU is exacerbating this, it begs the question of whether 
leaving the Eurozone is an optimal strategy for some member states. Or to be more precise, would 
exiting the Euro currency a) halt the legitimation crisis facing the democratic state and b) provide the 
capacity to carve out a more flexible response at the national level? At present this is an open question. 
It is simply not possible to calculate the risks of what would happen if this were to occur. But if one 
pushes the argument in this paper to its logical conclusion, namely that there are different varieties of 
capitalism in the Eurozone, then it is hard to justify a country keeping a currency that requires an 
adjustment that exacerbates rather than solves its debt crisis. But this argument assumes that the EMU 
currency in itself is the problem, whereas in actual fact it is the political constraints of governing a 
multi-level polity with national competing interests that is the real source of the crisis. If Europe could 
develop the institutional and fiscal capacities that would provide the necessary flexibility for national 
varieties of capitalism to co-exist, and develop long-term autonomous growth strategies with the same 
currency, then exiting the EMU would not be necessary. But at present the empirical conditions for 
this transfer of sovereignty to Europe are non-existent. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the attempt to join together different varieties of capitalism into a multi-
level polity with a single currency without a central government is the real source of the Eurozone 
crisis. The European response prescribes a one-size-fits-all approach of fiscal austerity and structural 
reforms that has exacerbated the divergence between core and peripheral regions of the EMU. The 
asymmetric implication of the Troika induced adjustment is a crisis of the democratic state in Ireland 
                                                     
65 In this regard, Ireland is no different to Germany in defending the domestic interests of its national model of capitalism 
66 See Hacker and Pierson (2010) for a detailed analysis of this political dilemma  
67 Scharpf, Fritz (2012) 
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and southern Europe. At national level, political parties change but policy remains the same. Creditors 
are prioritised over citizens. It is this empirical analysis of the emergent political and distributional 
tensions caused by EMU as a multi-level polity in-itself that distinguishes my contribution to the VoC 
literature in comparative political economy. The paper has concluded by arguing that the crisis can 
only be resolved by adopting a variegated response that is tailored to the specific institutional and 
political needs of each member state. Whether this requires some countries to leave the Eurozone is an 
open empirical question that necessitates further research. 
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Figure 4: Private Debt as a % of GDP 
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 Figure 5: Public Debt as a % of GDP 
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Figure 6: Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators  
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